ERC-8001: Agent Coordination Framework
Minimal, single-chain, multi-party agent coordination using EIP-712 attestations
Abstract
ERC-8001 defines a minimal, single-chain primitive for multi-party agent coordination. An initiator posts an intent and each participant provides a verifiable acceptance attestation. Once the required set of acceptances is present and fresh, the intent is executable. The standard specifies typed data, lifecycle, mandatory events, and verification rules compatible with EIP-712, ERC-1271, EIP-2098, and EIP-5267.
ERC-8001 omits privacy, reputation, threshold policies, bonding, and cross-chain semantics. Those are expected as optional modules that reference this specification.
Motivation
Agents in DeFi/MEV often need to act together without a trusted coordinator. Existing intent standards (e.g., ERC-7521, ERC-7683) define single-initiator flows and do not specify multi-party agreement.
ERC-8001 specifies the smallest on-chain primitive for that gap: an initiator's EIP-712 intent plus per-participant EIP-712/EIP-1271 acceptances. The intent becomes executable only when the required set of acceptances is present and unexpired. Canonical (sorted-unique) participant lists and standard typed data provide replay safety and wallet compatibility. Privacy, thresholds, bonding, and cross-chain are left to modules.
Specification
The keywords “MUST”, “SHOULD”, and “MAY” are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 and RFC 8174.
Implementations MUST expose the following canonical status codes for getCoordinationStatus
:
Status Codes
Implementations MUST use the canonical enum defined above:
-
None
= default zero state (intent not found) -
Proposed
= intent proposed, not all acceptances yet -
Ready
= all participants have accepted, intent executable -
Executed
= intent successfully executed -
Cancelled
= intent explicitly cancelled -
Expired
= intent expired before execution
Overview
This ERC specifies:
- A canonicalised EIP-712 domain for agent coordination,
- Typed data structures (
AgentIntent
,CoordinationPayload
,AcceptanceAttestation
), - Deterministic hashing rules,
- A standard interface (
IAgentCoordination
), - Lifecycle semantics (propose → accept → execute/cancel),
- Error surface and status codes.
EIP-712 Domain
Implementations MUST use the following EIP-712 domain:
Implementations SHOULD expose the domain via ERC-5267.
Primary Types
Typed Data Hashes
Computation (normative):
Clarifications (normative):
getIntentHash(intent)
MUST returnintentStructHash
(struct hash), not the full digest.AcceptanceAttestation.intentHash
MUST be that struct hash.- Each acceptance is signed over its own EIP-712 digest that includes this field.
participants
MUST be strictly ascending byuint160(address)
and deduplicated.
Interface
Implementations MUST expose the following interface and events.
Semantics
- Participants MUST be unique and sorted ascending. Implementations MUST reject non-canonical arrays.
proposeCoordination
:- Verifies EIP-712 signature by
agentId
using ECDSA for EOAs or ERC-1271 for contracts. - Requires
intent.expiry > block.timestamp
andintent.nonce > agentNonces[agentId]
. - Stores the canonicalised state and sets
agentNonces[agentId] = intent.nonce
. - Emits
CoordinationProposed
.
- Verifies EIP-712 signature by
acceptCoordination
:- Checks the intent exists and is not expired.
- Verifies the participant is listed and has not already accepted.
- Verifies the acceptance signature against the typed
AcceptanceAttestation
. - Records acceptance and stores the acceptance
expiry
for that participant. - Emits
CoordinationAccepted
with the typed acceptance hash. - Returns
true
when all required acceptances are present.
executeCoordination
:- Requires the intent to be in an executable state. In ERC-8001 the policy is all participants have accepted.
- Requires every stored acceptance to be unexpired at execution time.
- Verifies
payloadHash
matches the stored hash. - Emits
CoordinationExecuted
.
cancelCoordination
:- The proposer MAY cancel before execution. Anyone MAY cancel after expiry.
- Emits
CoordinationCancelled
.
- Status values are implementation-defined but MUST include Proposed, Ready, Executed, Cancelled, Expired.
executeCoordination
MUST:- Verify status == Ready (i.e., every participant has accepted).
- Verify
block.timestamp < intent.expiry
. - For each recorded acceptance: verify
block.timestamp < acceptance.expiry
. - Verify
keccak256(abi.encode(payload))
equals the storedpayloadHash
.
Nonces
ERC-8001 defines a single intent nonce per agent: agentNonces[agentId]
. Acceptance nonces are OPTIONAL in ERC-8001. If implemented, they MUST be strictly monotonic per agent.
Errors
Implementations SHOULD revert with descriptive custom errors (or equivalent revert strings) for the following baseline conditions, and MAY define additional errors for domain-specific modules (e.g. slashing, reputation, or privacy conditions):
- Expired intent
- Bad signature
- Non-participant
- Duplicate acceptance
- Acceptance expired at execute
- Payload hash mismatch
Rationale
- Sorted participant lists remove hash malleability and allow off-chain deduplication.
- Separation of intent and acceptance allows off-chain collation and a single on-chain check.
- Keeping ERC-8001 single-chain avoids coupling to bridge semantics and keeps the primitive audit-friendly.
- Wallet friendliness: EIP-712 arrays let signers see actual participant addresses.
Backwards Compatibility
ERC-8001 introduces a new interface. It is compatible with EOA and contract wallets via ECDSA and ERC-1271. It does not modify existing standards.
Reference Implementation
A permissive reference implementation is provided in contracts/AgentCoordination.sol
. It uses a minimal ECDSA helper and supports ERC-1271 signers. It enforces participant canonicalisation, intent nonces, acceptance freshness, and all-participants policy.
Security Considerations
- Replay: EIP-712 domain binding and monotonic nonces prevent cross-contract replay.
- Malleability: Low-s enforcement and 64/65-byte signature support are required.
- Equivocation: A participant can sign conflicting intents. Mitigate with module-level slashing or reputation.
- Liveness: Enforce TTL on both intent and acceptances. Executors should ensure enough time remains.
- MEV: If
coordinationData
reveals strategy, use a Privacy module with commit-reveal or encryption.
Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.