This document defines standardized broadcasting semantics and attributes for ERC-7786 cross-chain messaging that enable trustless message verification through cryptographic proofs. Messages are committed on source chains in verifiable ways, then verified on destination chains using cryptographic proofs of the source chain's state or transaction history. This approach provides cross-chain communication without relying on external validators or bridge operators.
Cross-chain messaging protocols typically rely on external validators, multisigs, or optimistic mechanisms that introduce trust assumptions and potential points of failure. Cryptographic proofs offer an alternative approach where messages can be verified using the consensus mechanisms and cryptographic commitments of the chains themselves (e.g. storage proofs for EVM chains).
However, cryptographic proof verification requires chain-specific routing information, proof data, and verification parameters that are not addressed by the base ERC-7786 interface. Additionally, while ERC-7786 defines basic broadcasting through "omitted or zeroed" recipient addresses, it does not specify granular broadcasting patterns that enable targeting specific chains or chain types. Enhanced broadcasting semantics enable messages to be sent with varying levels of specificity, from all addresses on a specific chain to all supported infrastructure.
This document standardizes these requirements as ERC-7786 attributes, enabling cryptographic proof-based messaging within the established cross-chain messaging framework. The specification supports multi-hop verification paths, allowing messages to traverse through multiple intermediary chains when direct verification is not possible.
The key benefits of this approach include:
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 and RFC 8174.
ERC-7786 defines broadcasting as using "omitted or zeroed" recipient addresses (containing an ERC-7930 interoperable address with all fields set to zero). This specification extends that concept to enable granular broadcasting patterns through ERC-7930's flexible address structure:
Broadcasting semantics in this specification extend ERC-7786 by allowing:
AddressLength set to 0 and specified ChainType and/or ChainReference to broadcast messages to all addresses on a given chainChainReferenceLength set to 0 and a specified ChainType to broadcast to all chains of a given typeReceivers of broadcast messages SHOULD validate the source and authenticity of messages according to their own security requirements.
This specification defines the following ERC-7786 attributes for cryptographic proof messaging. Gateways MUST return true if supportsAttribute is called with the selector for supported attributes.
route((bytes,bytes,uint256)[])Specifies the verification path from destination to source chain with corresponding proofs and version requirements. Each tuple contains a bytes-encoded address that SHOULD be called for verification of the next chain's state or transaction history, the cryptographic proof required for that verification step, and the expected version of the verification logic (0 means any version is acceptable). The route address MAY invoke other gateways to resend the message to the next hop.
When a non-zero version is specified, gateways MUST reject messages if the route address does not support the exact required version (unless 0). Route addresses SHOULD implement version querying mechanisms to enable compatibility checking.
The route MUST form a valid path where each step represents a direct relationship between chains that enables state or transaction verification. For multi-hop scenarios, the route creates a chain of trust where each step verifies the next, ultimately establishing the authenticity of the source chain's state. Gateways MUST reject messages with invalid or incomplete proof data.
inclusionProof(bytes)The cryptographic proof demonstrating that a specific message exists in the source chain's committed state at a finalized block or transaction. For EVM chains, this would typically be an event inclusion proof or storage proof.
ERC-7786 receivers MUST validate the cryptographic proof according to the source chain's proof system.
targetBlock(uint256)Specifies the block number or height on the source chain where the message was committed. For chains that don't use sequential block numbers, this represents the equivalent commitment identifier.
ERC-7786 receivers MAY validate the target block for freshness or finality requirements according to their security policies. Receivers MAY ignore this attribute if not needed for their use case.
When provided, this attribute SHOULD correspond to the block or commitment whose state is proven by the cryptographic proof.
This ERC provides standard attributes that enable protocols like ERC-7888 (for EVM storage proofs) and other proof systems to implement ERC-7786 gateways without rebuilding their core verification logic. For example, an ERC-7888 Broadcaster MAY expose an ERC-7786 interface using these attributes while maintaining its existing storage proof architecture. Similarly, other proof systems can implement these same attributes using their native proof mechanisms.
Gateways implementing this specification MAY implement caching mechanisms to optimize repeated proof verifications.
Gateways MAY choose to commit messages in ways that cannot be deleted or modified after being set, providing immutability guarantees. While not required by this standard, implementers can use ERC-7201 to calculate namespaces for immutable storage locations on EVM chains, or equivalent immutability mechanisms on other chain architectures.
In ERC-7786, the payload contains the actual message data to be delivered, while the attributes contain proof metadata that establishes the payload's authenticity. The destination gateway validates the attributes through cryptographic verification, and it MAY cache results for future use.
For multihop scenarios, each route step verifies the next chain's state commitment, creating a chain of trust from destination to source. This enables message verification across multiple intermediate chains, similar to systems like ERC-7888's BlockHashProver chains.
Message verification follows these steps:
route and inclusionProof attributes from the message, and optionally targetBlock if providedinclusionProof to verify that message data exists in the source chain's committed state at the target block obtained from the route verification. The source chain SHOULD correspond to the final validated step in the route verification processtargetBlock for freshness or finality requirements if the attribute is provided and the receiver chooses to validate itThis standard extends ERC-7786's attribute system to add cryptographic proof capabilities without creating new interfaces. This approach maintains compatibility with existing infrastructure while enabling trustless cross-chain verification, allowing implementations to focus on proof verification logic rather than rebuilding messaging infrastructure.
ERC-7786 natively supports broadcasting through "omitted or zeroed" ERC-7930 interoperable addresses. This specification extends that foundation to enable granular broadcasting patterns through ERC-7930's flexible address structure. Empty address components (AddressLength = 0) allow broadcasting to all addresses on a specific chain, while empty chain references (ChainReferenceLength = 0) enable broadcasting to all chains of a specific type (e.g., all EVM chains via eip155 namespace). Universal broadcasting uses fully zeroed addresses as defined in ERC-7786.
This multi-level broadcasting approach leverages ERC-7930's inherent address structure and ERC-7786's existing broadcast semantics rather than introducing new patterns, ensuring consistency with the cross-chain messaging ecosystem. The granularity enables efficient message distribution patterns: oracle feeds can target specific chains, governance messages can address entire chain families, and emergency notifications can reach all supported infrastructure.
Cryptographic proofs provide trustless verification relying only on chain consensus mechanisms. This approach offers universal accessibility, cryptographic guarantees, cost efficiency (gas only on source/destination chains), and enables implicit batching through shared state commitments. Multi-hop routing extends this capability to chains without direct verification relationships.
The two required attributes provide the essential functionality for cryptographic proof verification, while the optional targetBlock attribute enables additional freshness and finality validation when needed. Combining route information into a single tuple maintains type safety while separating proof verification from chain state transitions allows independent optimization. The optional nature of targetBlock provides implementation flexibility without adding unnecessary complexity to basic use cases.
Caching can improve performance by storing verification results for reuse. Since proofs are deterministic, they can be safely cached. This is especially useful for broadcast messages that need multiple verifications. Implementations should cache both block hash transitions and proof verification results, while invalidating the cache when proof infrastructure changes.
Proving a commitment that could be deleted or modified may introduce additional security risks. For example, if a message is committed in a way that allows deletion after the message is sent, the proof will still be valid. This is why the specification does not require immutability, but allows gateways to choose to commit messages in immutable ways if they so desire.
This ERC extends ERC-7786 through its attribute system and introduces no breaking changes to existing implementations. Gateways that do not support cryptographic proof attributes will simply reject messages containing them, which is the expected behavior for unsupported features.
Existing ERC-7786 tooling and infrastructure can immediately leverage cryptographic proof messaging without modification, as the base interface remains unchanged.
Gateways must rigorously validate all proof data to prevent message forgery, including proof format, completeness, and cryptographic validity. Route addresses must correspond to legitimate proof infrastructure forming a valid, connected path between chains. Only finalized blocks or equivalent commitment points should be used for proof generation to prevent reorganization attacks.
Consumers of cryptographic proof messages should implement appropriate freshness checks, as proofs can verify messages at any historical block or commitment, potentially including very old messages. This is not required for gateways offering immutable message commitments.
The security of a multi-hop route is only as strong as the weakest proof in the verification path. When multiple route steps are used, the overall security level is determined by the step with the lowest cryptographic guarantees or the least secure consensus mechanism. Implementers should carefully evaluate each hop in their routes and consider the cumulative security implications when designing cross-chain verification paths.
Since broadcast messages can be executed by any party, receivers should implement robust validation of message sources and contents. This includes verifying the sender's authority and the message's semantic validity.
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