This proposal defines a standard to prevent signature replays across multiple smart accounts when they are owned by a single Externally Owned Account (EOA). This is achieved through a defensive rehashing scheme for ERC-1271 verification using specific nested EIP-712 typed structures, which preserves the readability of the signed contents during wallet client signature requests.
Smart accounts can verify signatures with via ERC-1271 using the isValidSignature function.
A straightforward implementation as shown below, is vulnerable to signature replay attacks.
When multiple smart accounts are owned by a single EOA, the same signature can be replayed across the smart accounts if the hash does not include the smart account address.
Unfortunately, this is the case for many popular applications (e.g. Permit2). As such, many smart account implementations perform some form of defensive rehashing. First, the smart account computes a final hash from minimally: (1) the hash, (2) its own address, (3) the chain ID. Then, the smart account verifies the final hash against the signature. Defensive rehashing can be implemented with EIP-712, but a straightforward implementation will make the signed contents opaque.
This standard provides a defensive rehashing scheme that makes the signed contents visible across all wallet clients that support EIP-712. It is designed for minimal adoption friction. Even if wallet clients or application frontends are not updated, users can still inject client side JavaScript to enable the defensive rehashing.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 and RFC 8174.
The following dependencies are REQUIRED:
EIP-712 Typed structured data hashing and signing.
Provides the relevant typed data hashing logic internally, which is required to construct the final hashes.
ERC-1271 Standard Signature Validation Method for Contracts.
Provides the isValidSignature(bytes32 hash, bytes calldata signature) function.
ERC-5267 Retrieval of EIP-712 domain.
Provides the eip712Domain() function which is required to compute the final hashes.
This standard defines the behavior of the isValidSignature function for ERC-1271, which comprises of two workflows: (1) the TypedDataSign workflow, (2) the PersonalSign workflow.
TypedDataSign workflowThe TypedDataSign workflow handles the case where the hash is originally computed with EIP-712.
TypedDataSign final hashThe final hash for the TypedDataSign workflow is defined as:
where ‖ denotes the concatenation operator for bytes.
In Solidity, this can be written as:
where typedDataSignTypehash is:
If contentsType is "Mail(address from,address to,string message)", then contentsName will be "Mail".
The contentsName is the substring of contentsType up to (excluding) the first instance of "(":
In Solidity, this can be written as:
A copy of the LibString Solidity library is provided for completeness.
For safety, it is RECOMMENDED to treat the signature as invalid if any of the following is true:
contentsName is the empty string (i.e. bytes(contentsName).length == 0).contentsName starts with any of the following bytes abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz(.contentsName contains any of the following bytes , )\x00.TypedDataSign signatureThe signature passed into isValidSignature will be changed to:
where:
contents is the bytes32 struct hash of the original struct.contentsDescription is either:
contentsType (implicit mode),contentsType starts with contentsName.contentsType ‖ contentsName (explicit mode),contentsType may not necessarily start with contentsName.In Solidity, this can be written as:
The appended APP_DOMAIN_SEPARATOR and contents struct hash will be used to verify if the hash passed into isValidSignature is indeed correct via:
If the hash does not match the reconstructed hash, then the hash and signature are invalid under the TypedDataSign workflow.
PersonalSign workflowThis PersonalSign workflow handles the case where the hash is originally computed with EIP-191.
PersonalSign final hashThe final hash for the PersonalSign workflow is defined as:
where ‖ denotes the concatenation operator for bytes.
In Solidity, this can be written as:
Here, hash is computed in the application contract and passed into isValidSignature.
The smart account does not need to know how hash is computed. For completeness, this is how it can be computed:
PersonalSign signatureThe PersonalSign workflow does not require additional data to be appended to the signature passed into isValidSignature.
Smart accounts SHOULD return bytes4(0x77390001) for isValidSignature(0x7739773977397739773977397739773977397739773977397739773977397739, "") to indicate support for this standard.
The magic number bytes4(0x77390001) MAY be incremented if this standard gets updated.
As the isValidSignature signature function signature is unchanged, the implementation MUST be able to deduce the type of workflow required to verify the signature.
If the signature contains the correct data to reconstruct the hash, the isValidSignature function MUST perform the TypedDataSign workflow.
Otherwise, the isValidSignature function MUST perform the PersonalSign workflow.
In Solidity, the check can be written as:
Smart accounts MAY skip the defensive rehashing workflows if any of the following is true:
isValidSignature is called off-chain.hash passed into isValidSignature has already included the address of the smart account.As many developers may not update their applications to support the nested EIP-712 workflow, smart account implementations SHOULD try to accommodate by skipping the defensive rehashing where it is safe to do so.
TypedDataSign structureThe typedDataSignTypehash must be constructed on-the-fly on-chain. This is to enforce that the signed contents will be visible in the signature request, by requiring that contents be a user defined type.
The fields of eip712Domain are flattened into the TypedDataSign structure instead of being included as a field of type EIP712Domain in order to avoid a conflict with the domain type of the verifying contract in case it's different.
The bytes1 fields bitmap and uint256[] extensions array in ERC-5267 have been omitted. Differentiating between an absent field versus a zero field (e.g. bytes32(0)) offers no additional security benefits for on-chain defensive rehashing. The extensions parameter is a list of EIP numbers used for off-chain signaling.
contentsDescription with implicit and explicit modesWhen the contents structure contains nested types, EIP-712 lexicographical sorting can result in the contentsName not being positioned exactly at the start of the contentsType. As such, we need the explicit mode.
isValidSignatureFor easier implementation in modular smart accounts, we have decided to utilize the isValidSignature method to return a magic number instead of defining new functions.
contentsName beginning with any lowercase 7-bit ASCII characterThis recommendation is to keep the standard language agnostic and future-proof. Atomic types such as uint256 may be named differently in other languages (e.g. u256).
In an earlier draft, we have designated a supportsNestedTypedDataSign() function for support detection, which returns bytes4(0xd620c85a).
A production ready and optimized implementation is provided for reference.
It includes relevant complementary features required for safety, flexibility, developer experience, and user experience.
The reference implementation is intentionally not minimalistic. This is to avoid repeating the mistake of ERC-1271, where a minimalist reference implementation is wrongly assumed to be safe for production use.
contentsNameCurrent major implementations of eth_signTypedData do not sanitize the names of custom types.
A phishing website can craft a contentsName with control characters to break out of the PersonalSign type encoding, resulting in the wallet client asking the user to sign an opaque hash.
Requiring on-chain sanitization of contentsName will block this phishing attack vector.
An account that uses this method as replay protection for ERC-1271 signatures cannot have a signer that uses the same method. This is because a signature defines a TypedDataSign struct type with a member that has the type of the message being signed, and if the message being signed is another TypedDataSign struct, the resulting EIP-712 message will contain in its body two separate TypedDataSign types with incompatible contents, something that can't be represented in an EIP-712 request.
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