Predeploy two EIP-7685 request contracts for EIP-7732 builders, modelled on the request bus that EIP-7002 (withdrawals) and EIP-7251 (consolidations) use:
pubkey ++ withdrawal_credentials ++ amount ++ signature — and appends it to its queue. It serves both first deposits and top-ups: the consensus layer registers a builder on a pubkey's first appearance and credits additional stake on later deposits. The signature is carried in the record and verified by the consensus layer on dequeue.pubkey and appends a full-exit record authorized by the caller's address (recorded as source_address).Each contract maintains an in-state request queue drained by an end-of-block SYSTEM_ADDRESS system call; the dequeued records become the contract's EIP-7685 request_data, committed in the block requests_hash, and each accepted request is also emitted as an anonymous log. Neither touches the validator deposit contract or the validator request predeploys; for builders created after the fork, they replace EIP-7732's onboarding through the validator deposit flow.
EIP-7732 introduces builders as a separate, staked consensus-layer class. A builder is created by a deposit, can have stake added, and must be able to exit. Today EIP-7732 sources this lifecycle from the validator flows: a builder is registered by an ordinary validator deposit request whose withdrawal credential carries the 0x03 BUILDER_WITHDRAWAL_PREFIX, and a builder exits through a builder branch of the consensus-layer voluntary-exit operation. This EIP instead gives builders their own dedicated EIP-7685 request contracts.
Dedicated request types remove cross-actor coupling. Routing builders through the validator contracts forces the consensus layer to decide, on every request, whether it acts on the validator set or the builder set (today by inspecting the credential prefix). Dedicated builder request types make the actor explicit from the request type alone, so the validator and builder registries are keyed independently. A single public key can then be registered as both a validator and a builder. Under EIP-7732 the two cannot coexist for one key — a builder deposit is routed to the builder registry only when the key is not already a validator or pending validator, so deposit routing, not an explicit prohibition, keeps each key in at most one registry. Keying by request type removes that coupling: the registries become independent, and a key may appear in both with distinct indices and lifecycles (the only practical consequence is implementation-side; see Security Considerations).
The deposit bounds a consensus-side denial-of-service surface. A builder deposit's proof-of-possession is verified inline by the consensus layer when the deposit is processed — unlike a validator deposit, which is deferred to the churn-limited pending_deposits queue. Carried on the validator deposit request, builder deposits inherit its high per-payload ceiling, so an attacker submitting invalid-signature builder deposits at the 1-ETH builder minimum could force a full payload's worth of proof-of-possession checks. The coupled deposit request scheme also requires verifying all matching pending validator deposit signatures at builder deposit verification time. A dedicated request bus separates builder deposits from validator deposits — isolating the builder-side verification work — and caps them at MAX_DEPOSIT_REQUESTS_PER_BLOCK per block. The cap and separation are what bound the builder-side verification the consensus layer performs per block.
Exit gains a cold-key path builders lack today. EIP-7732 lets a builder exit only via a voluntary exit signed by its BLS key — the same hot key it uses to sign bids. The exit contract instead authorizes a full exit by the builder's execution_address (the address that owns its stake), exactly as EIP-7002 lets a validator's withdrawal credential trigger an exit. Routing builder exits through this request makes the consensus-layer voluntary-exit operation validator-only again.
Builders that must exist at the fork are unaffected: EIP-7732's fork-transition onboarding of builder-credentialed pending deposits is retained (see Changes to EIP-7732); only post-fork onboarding moves to the deposit contract. The deployed validator deposit contract is left untouched, and builder stake withdrawals continue to flow through EIP-7732's existing full-balance sweep.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 and RFC 8174.
The 0x03/0x04 request types MUST be unique across all active EIP-7685 request types, including in-flight proposals (EIP-7804, a Draft, also claims 0x03); final allocation is coordinated in consensus-specs.
| Name | Value | Comment |
|---|---|---|
BUILDER_DEPOSIT_CONTRACT_ADDRESS | 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000007732 | Predeploy address of the builder deposit contract |
BUILDER_EXIT_CONTRACT_ADDRESS | 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000007733 | Predeploy address of the builder exit contract |
BUILDER_DEPOSIT_REQUEST_TYPE | 0x03 | EIP-7685 request-type byte for builder deposits |
BUILDER_EXIT_REQUEST_TYPE | 0x04 | EIP-7685 request-type byte for builder exits |
SYSTEM_ADDRESS | 0xfffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe | Address that invokes the end-of-block system call (as in EIP-7002) |
MAX_DEPOSIT_REQUESTS_PER_BLOCK | 64 | Maximum records the builder deposit contract drains into one block |
TARGET_DEPOSIT_REQUESTS_PER_BLOCK | 8 | Per-block request count above which the fee rises for the deposit contract |
MAX_EXIT_REQUESTS_PER_BLOCK | 16 | Maximum records the builder exit contract drains into one block |
TARGET_EXIT_REQUESTS_PER_BLOCK | 2 | Per-block request count above which the fee rises for the exit contract |
MIN_REQUEST_FEE | 1 | Minimum request fee, in wei |
REQUEST_FEE_UPDATE_FRACTION | 17 | Controls the fee's rate of change |
EXCESS_INHIBITOR | 2**256-1 | Excess value that makes the fee getter revert before the first system call (as in EIP-7002/EIP-7251); set at deployment, cleared by the first system call |
BUILDER_MIN_DEPOSIT | 1000000000000000000 | Minimum credited stake for a deposit, in wei (1 ETH — the EIP-7732 builder minimum) |
BUILDER_DEPOSIT_CONTRACT_RUNTIME_CODE | see Reference Implementation | Runtime bytecode of the builder deposit contract |
BUILDER_EXIT_CONTRACT_RUNTIME_CODE | see Reference Implementation | Runtime bytecode of the builder exit contract |
Each predeploy is deployed exactly as the EIP-7002 and EIP-7251 request contracts are: by a one-time presigned transaction from a single-use deployer account (the Nick's-method scheme), so that BUILDER_DEPOSIT_CONTRACT_ADDRESS and BUILDER_EXIT_CONTRACT_ADDRESS are the addresses cryptographically derived from those transactions. Each contract's init code sets its excess slot to EXCESS_INHIBITOR, so no request can be enqueued until the inhibitor is cleared (see Request fee). The concrete transactions — and therefore the final addresses — will be fixed once the runtime bytecode is audited and frozen (see Reference Implementation).
The deployment transactions MUST be included before the fork that activates this EIP. If there is no code at either predeploy address once the EIP is active, every block from activation onward MUST be invalid — the same handling EIP-7002 and EIP-7251 specify for their predeploys.
Both predeploys follow the EIP-7002 / EIP-7251 request-bus pattern, reusing those contracts' storage layout: the EIP-1559-style excess counter in slot 0, the per-block request count in slot 1, the FIFO queue's head and tail indices in slots 2 and 3, and the queued records from slot 4 onward. There is no ABI: like EIP-7002/EIP-7251, each contract dispatches on the caller and on calldatasize alone.
SYSTEM_ADDRESS (the end-of-block system call): the predeploy MUST dequeue up to MAX_REQUESTS_PER_BLOCK records (oldest first), return their concatenation as that contract's request_data, advance its queue head past the returned records (resetting head and tail to zero when the queue fully drains, so the storage slots are reused), then update excess from the number of requests added in the block (excess = max(0, excess + count - TARGET_REQUESTS_PER_BLOCK), treating a current value of EXCESS_INHIBITOR as 0 so the first system call clears the inhibitor) and reset that count. Records beyond the per-block cap remain queued for subsequent blocks.LOG0, no topics).The execution layer prepends the contract's request-type byte and includes request_type ++ request_data in the block requests list, committed via the requests_hash (EIP-7685). The logs are informational only — the canonical flow of a request into the chain is the requests_hash.
The end-of-block system call to each predeploy follows the same rules EIP-7002 and EIP-7251 specify, restated here because EIP-7685 does not: the call is made as SYSTEM_ADDRESS with a dedicated gas limit of 30_000_000; the gas it consumes does not count against the block gas limit and no value is transferred; and if any of the predeploys' system calls fails or returns an error, the block MUST be invalid.
Each request carries a fee, computed exactly as in EIP-7002:
where fake_exponential is the integer approximation of MIN_REQUEST_FEE · e^(excess / REQUEST_FEE_UPDATE_FRACTION) used by EIP-1559. Because excess grows whenever a block contains more than TARGET_REQUESTS_PER_BLOCK requests and decays otherwise, the fee rises super-linearly under sustained demand and returns to MIN_REQUEST_FEE when demand subsides. The fee is charged on top of any staked value (see the request sections below) and is left locked in the contract.
As in EIP-7002/EIP-7251, each contract's excess is initialized to EXCESS_INHIBITOR at deployment, and the fee getter reverts while excess == EXCESS_INHIBITOR. Since a request is only appended after its fee is paid, this blocks every request between deployment and the first end-of-block system call; that call clears the inhibitor (treating the prior excess as 0), and normal fee operation runs from the activation block onward.
A deposit request is submitted by calling the deposit contract with calldata of exactly 184 bytes:
| Bytes | Field |
|---|---|
0:48 | pubkey — 48-byte BLS public key |
48:80 | withdrawal_credentials — 32-byte commitment (version byte + execution_address) |
80:88 | amount — big-endian uint64, in gwei (EIP-7002's input convention) |
88:184 | signature — 96-byte BLS proof-of-possession |
A deposit request serves both a builder's first deposit and subsequent top-ups. The contract MUST reject the request unless both of the following hold:
amount * 1 gwei >= BUILDER_MIN_DEPOSIT.msg.value >= fee, where fee is the current request fee, and msg.value - fee >= amount * 1 gwei — the value beyond the fee fully funds the stake. Any value beyond amount * 1 gwei + fee is retained by the contract and not credited to the builder.On success it MUST append the 184 input bytes to its queue and emit them as an anonymous log (which therefore carries the amount big-endian, as submitted). The dequeued BUILDER_DEPOSIT_REQUEST_TYPE record is pubkey (48) ++ withdrawal_credentials (32) ++ amount (8, little-endian) ++ signature (96): the input verbatim, with the amount converted to its little-endian SSZ encoding, as EIP-7002 returns its amount. The signature is carried in the record and verified by the consensus layer, which checks the proof-of-possession only on the pubkey's first appearance and treats a later deposit to an existing builder as a stake top-up (see Consensus-layer processing of records).
An exit request is submitted by calling the exit contract with calldata of exactly 48 bytes: the pubkey of the builder to exit. The contract MUST require msg.value >= fee (the same request fee as the deposit contract); it stakes no value and moves no ETH on the execution layer. On success it MUST append a BUILDER_EXIT_REQUEST_TYPE record of source_address (20) ++ pubkey (48) to its queue, where source_address is msg.sender, and emit the record as an anonymous log.
Authorization is by source_address, as in EIP-7002: the caller proves control of the builder by transacting from the builder's execution_address. The contract records msg.sender verbatim and performs no further check; the consensus layer honours the request only when source_address equals the target builder's execution_address (see Consensus-layer processing of records).
The consensus layer decodes each dequeued record into one of two SSZ containers, selected by request type:
A type's request_data is the concatenation of the fixed-size SSZ serializations of its records — 184 bytes per BuilderDepositRequest (pubkey ++ withdrawal_credentials ++ amount ++ signature) and 68 bytes per BuilderExitRequest (source_address ++ pubkey), with amount little-endian — exactly the bytes the system call returns, in the same order. BuilderDepositRequest is the validator EIP-6110 DepositRequest without the index field; the consensus layer verifies its signature (the proof-of-possession) on the builder's first registration.
Both request types are applied immediately when processed — a BuilderDepositRequest is not routed through the validator pending_deposits queue, so a builder's balance is credited without an activation-churn queue, preserving EIP-7732's existing behavior. (A newly registered builder still becomes active for bidding and exit only once its deposit epoch is finalized, per gloas is_active_builder; only the churn queue is skipped, not finality.)
BuilderDepositRequest (type 0x03) for a pubkey not yet in the builder set is a first deposit, handled by gloas process_builder_deposit_request. The consensus layer registers the builder if the proof-of-possession signature over the DepositMessage (pubkey, withdrawal_credentials, amount) under DOMAIN_BUILDER_DEPOSIT is valid (is_valid_builder_deposit_signature) — a builder-specific signing domain, distinct from the validator deposit's DOMAIN_DEPOSIT (see Security Considerations). On a valid signature it adds the builder with balance = amount, execution_address = the credential's last 20 bytes (withdrawal_credentials[12:]), and version = withdrawal_credentials[0] — the first credential byte is recorded as the builder's version (the only currently defined value is PAYLOAD_BUILDER_VERSION, 0), not checked against a fixed prefix. A record whose signature is invalid is ignored (consumed, stake forfeited). There is no on-chain credential-prefix check on this path: the 0x03 BUILDER_WITHDRAWAL_PREFIX is used only to mark deposits for builder onboarding at the fork (see Changes to EIP-7732) and is deprecated afterward.BuilderDepositRequest (type 0x03) for a pubkey already in the builder set is a top-up: it credits amount to the existing entry, and the record's withdrawal_credentials and signature are ignored — the registration is unchanged. This mirrors the validator deposit contract, where the proof-of-possession is checked only on a pubkey's first appearance and later deposits are stake additions. A builder index is reclaimed only once the builder has exited and its balance has swept to zero (get_index_for_new_builder), so until then a deposit to an exited pubkey is also a top-up: it credits the exited entry and, per process_builder_deposit_request, resets its withdrawable_epoch to current_epoch + MIN_BUILDER_WITHDRAWABILITY_DELAY, extending the withdrawal delay on the entry's balance. It does not reactivate the builder for bidding (is_active_builder requires withdrawable_epoch == FAR_FUTURE_EPOCH); the stake ultimately sweeps to the entry's execution_address. Re-registering the key as a fresh builder requires waiting for its index to be recycled.BuilderExitRequest (type 0x04) is handled by gloas process_builder_exit_request and MUST be ignored unless its pubkey is a registered, active builder (is_active_builder: its deposit epoch is finalized and it is not already exiting), its source_address equals that builder's execution_address, and the builder has no pending balance to withdraw (get_pending_balance_to_withdraw_for_builder == 0). When all hold it runs initiate_builder_exit (withdrawable_epoch = current_epoch + MIN_BUILDER_WITHDRAWABILITY_DELAY). Like EIP-7002's process_withdrawal_request, it authorizes by source_address (no BLS signature) and silently returns on any failed check — the record is consumed and discarded, not re-queued, and the fee is spent. There is no builder-version check on exit; the execution_address, fixed at registration, is the sole authorizer. Because an active builder routinely has a non-zero pending balance from recent bid payments, a legitimate exit may be dropped until those settle, in which case the caller must resubmit once the pending balance has been swept. (The execution layer dequeues the record deterministically regardless, so a dropped request never affects requests_hash agreement.)This EIP modifies EIP-7732's builder lifecycle on the consensus layer:
process_deposit_request — the former builder branch (the apply_deposit_for_builder path) is removed, so the function reverts to its validator-only EIP-6110 behavior — and builders are created and topped up only through BUILDER_DEPOSIT_REQUEST_TYPE, handled by the new process_builder_deposit_request. A consequence operators must heed: a deposit to the validator deposit contract is now always an ordinary validator deposit, even if its withdrawal_credentials carries the 0x03 prefix. Such a deposit is queued in pending_deposits and mints a validator that cannot withdraw its balance (a 0x03 credential is neither a BLS nor an execution withdrawal credential). Builder deposits MUST therefore be sent to the builder deposit contract.onboard_builders_from_pending_deposits, run once by upgrade_to_gloas, is retained: builder-credentialed deposits already in pending_deposits at the upgrade are onboarded as builders, so builders exist from the first slot of the fork. This is the only path that onboards builders through the validator deposit contract. Operators seed the initial set by depositing to the existing deposit contract with a BUILDER_WITHDRAWAL_PREFIX (0x03) credential before the fork — late enough that the deposit is still pending at the upgrade (a deposit applied earlier would create a stranded validator). These seed deposits are validated under DOMAIN_DEPOSIT (the only domain the validator deposit contract signs for) by is_valid_deposit_signature, and each onboarded builder is recorded with version = PAYLOAD_BUILDER_VERSION. After the fork, BUILDER_WITHDRAWAL_PREFIX is deprecated; a 0x03-credentialed deposit that misses the snapshot is processed as the stranded validator above, so the operator must onboard through BUILDER_DEPOSIT_REQUEST_TYPE instead. No pubkey is onboarded by more than one path.process_voluntary_exit — its former builder branch is removed, making the voluntary-exit operation validator-only again — and builders exit only via BUILDER_EXIT_REQUEST_TYPE, handled by the new process_builder_exit_request.Two predeploys, two request types. Mirroring withdrawals (0x01) and consolidations (0x02) — each a single-type request predeploy — builder deposits (0x03) and exits (0x04) are separate predeploys sharing a common queue implementation. An empty-calldata SYSTEM_ADDRESS call returns a flat request_data, so the execution layer needs no new read semantics, and the consensus layer routes by request type rather than by inspecting credentials.
One request for deposits and top-ups. A single deposit request serves both: a deposit to a new pubkey registers a builder (the consensus layer verifies the proof-of-possession), and a deposit to an existing builder tops up its stake — exactly as the validator deposit contract does. A top-up cannot redirect a builder's withdrawal target, because the consensus layer ignores the supplied withdrawal_credentials and signature for an existing builder; and a junk deposit to a new pubkey cannot register a builder without a valid proof-of-possession.
Exit by execution_address; voluntary exit becomes validator-only. A builder's BLS key is hot — it signs bids continuously — so authorizing exit with that key is undesirable. Routing exit through the execution_address (the cold address that owns the builder's stake and receives its withdrawals) mirrors EIP-7002's rationale for letting 0x01 credentials trigger validator exits, and removing the builder branch from the voluntary-exit operation gives builders a single, well-defined exit authorizer. Losing the execution_address key strands no funds that were not already stranded: that address is where the builder's balance is swept regardless.
EIP-1559-style request fee. Each request carries the same demand-responsive fee as EIP-7002/EIP-7251: super-linear above TARGET_REQUESTS_PER_BLOCK, decaying back to MIN_REQUEST_FEE when demand subsides. Together with the per-block cap and the per-deposit stake, the fee meters submission to each predeploy.
Onboarding via the fork transition. Some applications depend on builders existing from the first slot of the fork. EIP-7732 already onboards builder-credentialed pending deposits during the fork upgrade; retaining that — rather than relying on post-fork deposits to the new contract, which cannot populate the first slot — keeps the initial builder set available immediately. This onboarding runs once, atomically, inside upgrade_to_gloas, so the per-block cap and request fee — which meter ongoing, adversarial submission to the steady-state contract — do not apply to it. Its cost is not constant-bounded: it processes the entire pending_deposits queue and verifies a proof-of-possession per new builder, which the consensus-layer spec notes may be slow and which clients SHOULD pre-verify and cache in the slots before the fork.
This EIP is additive at the execution layer: it introduces new contracts at previously empty addresses. It does not modify the validator deposit contract at 0x00000000219ab540356cbb839cbe05303d7705fa, the validator withdrawal/consolidation predeploys, or any existing validator's lifecycle.
At the consensus layer it modifies EIP-7732 (see Changes to EIP-7732): post-fork builder onboarding moves from the validator deposit request to BUILDER_DEPOSIT_REQUEST_TYPE, and builder exits move from the voluntary-exit operation to BUILDER_EXIT_REQUEST_TYPE. The fork-transition onboarding of builder-credentialed pending deposits is unchanged, so builders present at the fork are unaffected. The new request types are additive — blocks that contain no builder requests produce empty request_data for these types, which EIP-7685 excludes from the requests_hash.
DepositMessage (pubkey, withdrawal_credentials, amount) under DOMAIN_BUILDER_DEPOSIT on a builder's first registration, and ignores the signature for top-ups. The per-block cap bounds how many such verifications the consensus layer performs per block; see Spam and state growth below for the full anti-abuse picture.DOMAIN_BUILDER_DEPOSIT, a signing domain distinct from the validator deposit's DOMAIN_DEPOSIT. The separate domain prevents cross-contract replay between the two deposit classes: a validator deposit proof-of-possession cannot be resubmitted as a builder deposit, and a builder deposit proof-of-possession cannot be resubmitted to the validator deposit contract — each contract's consensus-layer handler verifies only its own domain, so the two classes cannot cross-register. The single exception is fork-transition onboarding: the initial builder set is seeded through the validator deposit contract before the fork, so those seed deposits are necessarily signed under DOMAIN_DEPOSIT and validated under it by onboard_builders_from_pending_deposits, with the 0x03 BUILDER_WITHDRAWAL_PREFIX on the credential distinguishing them for builder onboarding; after the fork the prefix is deprecated and steady-state builder deposits use DOMAIN_BUILDER_DEPOSIT. Like DOMAIN_DEPOSIT, the builder domain is chain- and fork-agnostic, so a builder's own public proof-of-possession remains replayable as a top-up (see Replayable deposit records below) — but only within the builder class, funding stake the original signer already authorized, and it can redirect nothing.msg.sender as source_address and performs no further check. Because the request carries no signature, this is the sole authorization: the consensus layer MUST initiate an exit only when source_address equals the target builder's execution_address, or an arbitrary caller could exit a builder it does not control. A builder's only exit authorizer is therefore its execution_address; the voluntary-exit (BLS-key) path is removed for builders.get_pending_balance_to_withdraw_for_builder == 0), every winning bid adds a pending payment, and the execution_address is the builder's sole exit authorizer (the BLS voluntary-exit path is removed). When the execution_address (the capital owner) and the BLS key (the bidding operator) are held by different parties — a custodial or staking-pool arrangement this design explicitly enables — the operator can keep the pending balance non-zero by continuing to win bids, so the capital owner cannot satisfy the exit precondition and the stake stays locked (a builder that never exits is never swept). The standoff is self-limiting, since the operator's bids must keep being included on-chain, but the protocol gives the execution_address holder no on-chain lever to halt bidding. Parties delegating builder operation SHOULD retain off-chain (contractual or operational) control over the operator's bidding, so a delegated builder can always be brought to a state in which it can exit.process_builder_deposit_request notes this) — so clients that cache builder state by index MUST account for reuse.(pubkey, withdrawal_credentials, amount, signature) is public in calldata, so a third party can submit a further 0x03 record for an already-registered builder at an arbitrary amount (funding it themselves). The consensus layer treats any 0x03 record for an already-registered pubkey as a top-up — crediting stake but ignoring the credentials and signature — so the replay cannot redirect a builder's withdrawals or re-register it; it is a harmless funded stake addition.request_data size per block — not enqueue: within a block, appends are limited only by gas, and the in-state queue grows across blocks, reclaiming slots only when it fully drains. Queue growth is instead gated by the value locked per record: every deposit locks at least BUILDER_MIN_DEPOSIT (1 ETH) plus the fee, so growing the queue by N records costs at least N ETH locked. A griefer submitting valid proofs-of-possession forfeits nothing — the stake becomes a real, withdrawable builder balance (a capital-lock for MIN_BUILDER_WITHDRAWABILITY_DELAY, not a burn) — so post-fork onboarding can be throttled behind a FIFO wall of attacker deposits for the cost of locking capital; the cap plus FIFO ordering, not the fee, is the binding throttle. This is tolerable because the time-critical initial builder set is seeded before the fork through the uncapped onboarding path, not through the steady-state contract.BUILDER_MIN_DEPOSIT is enforced only at the execution layer (as the validator deposit contract enforces its own minimum), with no consensus-layer re-assertion.SYSTEM_ADDRESS may invoke the end-of-block dequeue; any other empty-calldata call is the fee getter and does not modify state, so a non-system caller cannot drain or replay the queue. Each contract returns at most MAX_REQUESTS_PER_BLOCK records per block, bounding both the size each predeploy contributes to the block requests and the consensus-layer work to process them; excess records remain queued for later blocks.Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.