EIP-8068: Neutral effective balance design

Abstract

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This EIP proposes a neutral effective balance (EB) design to ensure 0x01 (skimming) and 0x02 (compounding) validators receive equal yields. Currently, validators that compound their balance have poor capital efficiency and lower yields as their idle balance (not contributing to EB) is 0.75 ETH, significantly higher than that of skimming validators at near-zero. This disincentivizes stake consolidation critical to Ethereum's fast finality roadmap. Additionally, the current hysteresis rules allow 0x02 validators to game the hysteresis by keeping their balance below the EB. The increased profitability at lower balances could further harm consolidation. This proposal sets the EB hysteresis upward threshold to the neutral +0.5 and the downward threshold to +0.25. To prevent gaming after operations like partial withdrawals, the EB is reset to the floor of the balance, and a one-time temporary_upward_threshold set. This threshold is derived from an integral equation that ensures the average idle balance is zero as the validator's balance compounds up to the next integer.

Motivation

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The roadmap for fast finality hinges on stake consolidation, where staking service providers (SSPs) transition from running 32-ETH validators with 0x01 credentials to compounding validators with 0x02 credentials. A roadblock to this transition is that 0x01 validators have close-to-ideal capital efficiency, whereas 0x02 validators have poor capital efficiency during compounding. Furthermore, the optimal configuration for a 0x02 validator is to reduce its balance to 32.75 ETH and prevent it from compounding further. These incentives may lead Ethereum's fast-finality roadmap to be delayed. To prevent this, a neutral effective balance calculation is proposed, that sees all validator configurations earn the same CL yield.

A 0x02 validator that compounds its balance $b$ as intended will on average have 0.75 ETH of its balance not counting toward its effective balance (EB, or $E$ in equations). Specifically, with the current EB step bands, the idle remainder $r=b-E \in[0.25, 1.25)$ and $\bar{r}=(0.25+1.25)/2=0.75$. A 0x01 validator operating at 32 ETH has a much lower idle remainder, on average half the withdrawal sweep of $0.0235/2 = 0.01175$ ETH. A 32-ETH 0x01 validator will therefore earn around 2.3% more CL yield than a compounding 0x02 validator that grows from 32.25 ETH to 34.25 ETH over around two years.

A separate issue is that 0x02 validators can make a partial withdrawal down to 32.75 ETH when having any EB >33 ETH, leveraging the hysteresis to retain a 33 ETH EB. The surplus capital can then be deployed to increase the staking yield, running multiple 32.75-ETH validators. Assuming a 3% CL yield, recurring partial withdrawals deployed at 33 ETH to bring down the balance to 32.75 ETH, and ignoring the exit queue capital drag, the approach is more profitable than running skimming 2048-ETH validators under current base fees.

To uphold fairness while not disrupting the current operation of 0x01 validators, the following changes are made:

• The upward EB step from $E$ to $E+1$ is imposed at $E + 0.5$. During regular upward compounding, the EB is thus set as the balance rounded to the nearest integer. This leads a compounding 0x02 validator to on average have a $E=b$, just like a 32-ETH 0x01 validator.
• The downward step to $E$ is imposed at $E+0.25$ ($E_{+1}-0.75$).
• Partial withdrawals are prevented from gaming the protocol. The EB calculation is designed such that each partial withdrawal is treated neutrally: $E=b$. To achieve this, the following takes place after every partial withdrawal at epoch boundaries:
  • The EB is initiated to the integer floor of the balance: $E = \text{EB}(b_0) = \lfloor b_0 \rfloor$.
  • A new field temporary_upward_threshold ($t$) is stored in the beacon state.
  • This threshold is computed as $t = E + \frac{1+(b_0-E)^2}{2}$, derived from the integral equation that stipulates that the validator will on average have $E=b$ when it smoothly grows its balance up until the next integer (see the Rationale).
  • To increase the EB, the balance must satisfy both the regular upward threshold and the temporary_upward_threshold, after which temporary_upward_threshold is reset to 0.

Specification

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Parameters

Change two existing constants:

Constant	Value
HYSTERESIS_DOWNWARD_MULTIPLIER	3
HYSTERESIS_UPWARD_MULTIPLIER	2

Containers

Two new fields are added to the state:

On upgrade, both lists are initialized to length len(state.validators) with 0 and False respectively.

Functions

A new helper is added for re-initializing EB and the temporary_upward_threshold for validators that have been marked for EB reset; this helper is invoked during epoch processing.

The existing process_effective_balance_updates() is modified to call the new helper before updating the EB, and so that the EB update accounts for the temporary_upward_threshold. We show here the whole function for completeness:

When processing partial withdrawal, the flag for reseting the EB is set.

Rationale

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Relative change in staking yield

The figure shows the impact of the current EB bands and hysteresis design on validator yields for different validator configuations. The relative change in staking yield is plotted against a baseline 0 which corresponds to what compounding 0x02 validators would earn if $E=b$, as in the neutral effective balance design. Note that these are relative changes, so a validator at -0.01 under a CL yield of 3% would earn $0.99 \times 3 = 2.97$% in yield.

The blue line is compounding 0x02 validators, which on average will have 0.75 ETH not counting against their EB. A staker that runs a 0x02 validator instead of a 0x01 validator then earns $100\times0.75/b$% lower staking yield. For example, at 32.25 ETH, that difference works out to 2.33%.

The red lines capture 0x02 validators that repeatedly withdraw down to the downward hysteresis threshold at $-0.25$ relative to an integer EB, thus achieving a surplus 0.25 EB relative to their actual balance. They let the balance grow until it is optimal to withdraw it, accounting for a partial withdrawal costing 84500 gas. So for example, starting at 32.75 ETH and with a 0.5 gwei base fee, that works out to making the withdrawal at around 32.80 ETH. The staker then earns 0.56% more staking yield than the baseline, factoring in a 4.5 days delay between when the withdrawn ETH stops earning yield and when it is available at the EL (dashed red line). This delay accounts for a 256 epoch withdrawal eligibility period and an average wait time until the sweep hits of 3.4 days (at a hypothetical future 770 000 active validators). Without the delay, that figure is 0.60%. When the base is 0 and there is a 4.5 days delay, the validator instead earns 0.72% more staking yield (full red line).

The green circles are sweeped 0x01 validators. They earn slightly less than the baseline due to the accruing balance in excess of 32 ETH and 2048 ETH not counting toward the EB, and being delayed by around 3.4 days. (in this specific example where the delay )

This comparison could be nuanced further by potentially accounting for a deposit delay, but the ETH does not necessarily need to be deposited directly into the staking contract to bring value to its holder. Another nuance is that a slashing is driven by EB and not validator balance.

Equation for the temporary upward threshold

To prevent gaming after a partial withdrawal, the EB is first reset to $E = \lfloor b_0 \rfloor$, where $b_0$ is the new balance. This creates an initial idle remainder $r_0 = b_0 - E$.

A temporary_upward_threshold ($t$) is then set to ensure the average idle balance is zero as the validator's balance compounds from $b_0$ to the next integer, $E+1$.

This threshold $t$ is calculated to solve the "zero-area" problem: the positive idle balance accumulated while $\text{EB}=E$ (from $b_0$ to $t$) must exactly cancel the negative idle balance accumulated while $\text{EB}=E+1$ (from $t$ to $E+1$). This is expressed by the integral equation:

$\int_{b_0}^{t}(b-E) db + \int_{t}^{E+1}(b-(E+1)) db = 0.$

Solving for $t$ yields the formula used in the specification:

$t = E + \frac{1+r_0^2}{2},$

where $r_0 = b_0 - E$.

Alternative specifications

Simple fix of EB gaming under current bands

An alternative minimal specification is to only fix the gaming incentive, and instead compensate for the lower yield of 0x02 validators by increasing the withdrawal fee in EIP-8062. Only the partial withdrawal is adjusted. For this specification, only the pending_eb_resets need to be stored in the BeaconState:

Append the validator index to pending_eb_resets in process_withdrawals():

Modify process_effective_balance_updates() to reset the effective balance upon a partial withdrawal. The balance is never allowed to increase during the reset.

Security Considerations

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This EIP would trigger a mass upward change of EBs at the specific hardfork boundary. The effect of this should be analyzed furher.

Copyright

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Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.