Proposers and builders can currently permute pending transactions arbitrarily, enabling reorder‑driven MEV. This EIP introduces a consensus rule that sorts all transactions inside a block by XOR‑ing each transaction hash with fresh slot randomness. The randomness is unknown until the slot starts, so the order is deterministic once known but unpredictable beforehand. The mechanism significantly reduces reorder‑based MEV; latency‑driven back‑running, censorship, and other classes of MEV remain and should be mitigated through complementary techniques (encrypted mempools, reputation, PBS marketplaces, etc.).
Unrestricted ordering is the key enabler of sandwich and classic front‑running attacks. Deterministic ordering collapses these vectors to latency racing and information asymmetry. Clear candidate‑set and bundle semantics preserve fee markets while removing the need for trusted sequencers. Academic works shows deterministic ordering drives sandwich profits toward zero.
Julia Ofoegbu, “Maximal Extractable Value (MEV): A Tale As Old As Time,” Medium (2024).
J. Qian et al., “Deterministic Transaction Ordering Without Trusted Sequencers,” arXiv:2411.03327 v1 (2024).
“Shutter Network Introduces Plan for First Encrypted Mempool on Ethereum,” GlobeNewswire, 13 Feb 2025.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 and RFC 8174.
RWe define our randomness R as the randao_reveal of the each slot, after EIP-7998, since this EIP provides slot-by-slot randomness for randao_reveal (only predictable for the builder). This provides enough randomness for our purpose of reducing MEV attacks by MEV bots.
H(tx) ⊕ R ascending, then secondary key H(tx) ascending, in case of collision on the primary key.Definition – A bundle is a user‑signed list of fully‑signed transactions. Each child_tx_rlp is the canonical signed RLP encoding, including signature fields (v, r, s). The bundle begins with a fee‑payment transaction that covers gas and builder tip for the entire bundle.
Hashing / sort key – Treat the bundle as a virtual transaction with key H(concat(child_tx_rlps)), where:
child_tx_rlps[i] MUST be the exact bytes that will later appear in the block body for that transaction, i.e. the canonical RLP of the fully‑signed transaction per EIP‑2718 / EIP‑155 rules (for typed transactions the leading type byte and length prefix are included).(v,r,s); those 65 bytes are hashed as‑is so every participant derives an identical bundle key.Gas accounting – Bundle gas is the sum of the gasLimit fields of all child transactions. Builders use that sum when evaluating step 3.
Fit‑or‑skip rule – If the bundle (fee‑payment + children) would exceed the remaining gas limit, the bundle is skipped atomically.
Here is a pseudocode for the above flow:
A block is invalid if the executed list deviates from the canonical order derived from its randomness and the included transactions/bundles. Verification is objective; fork‑choice remains unchanged.
Sorting ≤ 1 500 transactions remains O(n log n) (< 1 ms), on today's hardware.
randomness: Specified in the specification.txOrderingVersion = 1 flag: To be compatible with the existing consensus rule and adding compatibility for future rules if needed.ORDERING_FORK_EPOCH: Beacon‑chain epoch at which execution clients start to recognise the new fields randomness and txOrderingVersion.ORDERING_TRANSITION_EPOCHS window activate the rule: 64 epochs (~13.6 h). Length of the transition window during which blocks with either ordering version are accepted.Both parameters are constants in the fork config and may be tuned during test‑net experiments.
Consensus‑layer upgrade — Beacon‑chain fork at ORDERING_FORK_EPOCH activates EL‑VRF‑exposure (companion EIP) and begins populating the vrf_output_proposer field. Execution clients receiving the ExecutePayload after this epoch expect a non‑zero randomness field.
Execution‑layer handshake — Builders and proposers include the new randomness and txOrderingVersion fields in Engine API engine_newPayloadV3 calls. Legacy nodes that have not upgraded will reject the payload, causing a natural chain split and economic incentive to upgrade.
Transition window — For ORDERING_TRANSITION_EPOCHS after ORDERING_FORK_EPOCH, clients accept:
Version 0 blocks — txOrderingVersion == 0; no randomness; legacy ordering.
Version 1 blocks — txOrderingVersion == 1; valid randomness; canonical ordering enforced. During this period proposers are encouraged (but not forced) to adopt version 1 so that fee markets and MEV supply chains have time to adjust.
ORDERING_FORK_EPOCH + ORDERING_TRANSITION_EPOCHS the consensus rule changes: blocks MUST set txOrderingVersion == 1 and pass canonical‑order validation. A version‑0 block after this point is treated as invalid and will not be considered by fork‑choice.Objective & Verifiable – Using a function of on‑chain randomness (R) and a transaction’s own hash gives every validator an identical, cheap check on order validity.
Unpredictable Until Slot Start – The XOR of slot‑level RANDAO and the proposer’s VRF output ensures that neither users nor builders can know the final sort key before the slot begins, closing the classic front‑run window.
Minimal Surface Area – A single 16‑byte field in the execution payload plus a hash operation keeps consensus changes small and auditable.
XOR is associative, fast, and requires no extra cryptographic assumptions beyond SHA‑2 already used for H(tx).
Any bias in one entropy component (e.g., RANDAO) is negated unless the attacker also controls the VRF output.
Preserves fee‑market incentives: high‑tip transactions still rise to the top of inclusion competition.
Avoids forced inclusion of low‑value spam that could bloat blocks if the entire mempool were blindly sorted.
Guarantees total order with negligible extra cost.
Leverages a value already known to every node; no extra field is needed.
Cross‑address atomicity (e.g., borrower + lender tx pair) cannot be expressed via nonce order alone.
Requiring an explicit fee‑payment transaction embeds pricing for the externality a bundle imposes on ordering neutrality.
Ensures all clients compute the same gas impact, preventing divergent execution.
Avoids partial bundle execution, which would undermine user intent.
Prevents accidental consensus splits by giving node operators a grace period.
Mirrors previous successful hard forks (e.g., London’s BASE_FEE activation sequence).
Single‑validator bias – A block proposer can not change its randao_reveal output after EIP-7998, only predictable to him.
Coalition bias – Multiple consecutive‑slot proposers could attempt to influence RANDAO by withholding signatures, but the protocol already slashes equivocation and missed attestations. The cost rises exponentially with coalition size, and the added VRF entropy further randomizes R.
Forkable bias – Re‑org attempts longer than depth 1 must overcome the usual consensus finality thresholds. Because R is embedded in the execution payload, any fork conflicts are objectively detectable by all nodes.
Conclusion: Collusion attacks are economically unattractive; the mixed entropy from RANDAO and VRF provides strong unpredictability guarantees.
New signatures are required only when calldata changes, but attacks must begin after block is built. Propagation delays and inclusion fees sharply limit profitable grinding to high‑value trades.
Secondary key H(tx) guarantees total order; collision probability (2^{-256}) is negligible.
Explicit summation rule ensures every client computes identical gas usage for bundles, preventing divergent validation.
Back‑running & latency – Persist.
Builder discretion – Builders may censor or selectively include transactions while forming the candidate set; exactly like the current status of Ethereum.
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